JuriScripta

A sample brief. Produced by the live system on 6 September 2026 and shown as it came out, unedited.

“I missed my immigration hearing three months ago because my lawyer never told me the date. What are my options?”

Found 6 cases in the court record and read them in full. Checked 7 claims against those opinions: 6 grounded, 1 not supported. 10 minutes, start to finish.

The check caught a claim the opinion doesn’t support.

A second model, from a different company, reread each cited opinion and tested every claim in the draft against it. This is what it flagged.

“was described in separate opinions in Matter of Lei as holding that ineffective assistance can constitute an exceptional circumstance supporting rescission of an in absentia order” — Matter of Grijalva

The provided Grijalva opinion does not address ineffective assistance of counsel at all; the respondent had no counsel of record at the time of the missed hearing, and the case instead concerns certified-mail service requirements under former section 242B. The excerpt explicitly notes the (A) prong of the rescission statute (which would cover 'exceptional circumstances') is not even quoted or discussed in the opinion. There is no basis in this text for the claim that Grijalva held IAC can be an exceptional circumstance, and the excerpt (which is of Grijalva itself, not Matter of Lei) cannot verify what a separate opinion in Lei said about Grijalva.

Options After Missing an Immigration Hearing

First, obtain the Immigration Court record immediately. The facts provided do not establish whether the Immigration Judge entered an in absentia removal order, the date of any order, whether the lawyer was counsel of record, or how the hearing notice was served. Those facts determine the available basis for reopening and the deadline.

Request or obtain:

  • The Immigration Judge’s order, if any;
  • The hearing notice and service records;
  • Any Form EOIR-28 or other record showing whether the lawyer was counsel of record;
  • The docket history; and
  • Copies of notices sent to your address and to counsel.

1. If an in absentia order was entered: consider an immediate motion to reopen and rescind

The current statutory rescission provision is INA § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C). It provides two materially different grounds:

  • Exceptional circumstances: A motion based on exceptional circumstances must be filed within 180 days after the date of the in absentia order. INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(i).
  • Lack of notice: A motion alleging that the person did not receive the required notice may be filed at any time. INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii).

Because the hearing was about three months ago, an exceptional-circumstances motion may still be within 180 days, but the clock runs from the date of the in absentia order, not necessarily the hearing date. The motion should be prepared and filed promptly rather than waiting for the deadline calculation to become close.

The verified historical authorities reflect the same basic distinction: a 180-day period for exceptional circumstances and an at-any-time route for lack of notice. Matter of Lei, 22 I. & N. Dec. 113, 115–16 (BIA 1998). Lei, however, interpreted former INA § 242B, which has been replaced by INA § 240(b)(5); it should not be treated as resolving current procedural rules or controlling federal-circuit law.

2. Attorney failure to communicate the hearing date may support an exceptional-circumstances motion, but the current authorities must be checked

The central factual claim would be that prior counsel failed to tell you the hearing date despite undertaking responsibility to communicate with you. That should be raised promptly as an ineffective-assistance-based exceptional-circumstances claim if the facts support it.

The materials supplied report that separate opinions in Lei described a different decision, Matter of Grijalva, 21 I. & N. Dec. 472 (BIA 1996), as holding that ineffective assistance can be an “exceptional circumstance” supporting rescission of an in absentia order. Lei, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 128, 137–38 (separate opinions). That 1996 decision is distinct from the 1995 Grijalva decision cited below. Because the 1996 decision itself is not independently included among the verified authorities, this answer cannot state its precise holding or current validity. It should be located and checked, along with current BIA and controlling-circuit authority.

For an ineffective-assistance claim generally, Matter of Lozada identifies a framework requiring:

  1. Your affidavit describing the agreement with former counsel and what counsel did or did not tell you;
  2. Notice to former counsel of the allegations and an opportunity to respond; and
  3. A statement whether you filed a disciplinary complaint, and, if not, why not.
    Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988).

Your declaration should specifically address:

  • When and how you retained the lawyer;
  • What the lawyer agreed to do concerning hearing notices and case updates;
  • Whether the lawyer had your correct phone number, email, and mailing address;
  • Whether you received any notice directly from the court;
  • Your efforts to contact the lawyer before the hearing;
  • When and how you learned of the missed hearing or order; and
  • Why you did not know the hearing date.

Preserve the retainer agreement, payment records, texts, emails, call logs, messaging records, and any requests you made for updates.

Lozada explains ineffective assistance in due-process terms: counsel’s conduct must have made the proceeding fundamentally unfair by preventing the person from reasonably presenting the case, and prejudice is required. Id. at 638. The supplied authorities do not establish the current governing circuit’s requirements concerning strict versus substantial Lozada compliance, prejudice, diligence, or equitable tolling. Those issues require jurisdiction-specific current research.

3. A statutory lack-of-notice theory is separate and should be evaluated carefully

A lack-of-notice claim is distinct from an ineffective-assistance/exceptional-circumstances claim. Under the current statute, the lack-of-notice route is not subject to the 180-day limit. INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii).

But whether this route applies when the court served counsel of record and counsel failed to tell the client is authority-dependent. In Lei, the majority mentioned the former regulation under which notice to counsel constituted notice to the noncitizen, but it did not decide whether counsel’s receipt coupled with a failure to communicate could support rescission under the separate lack-of-notice provision. Lei, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 114, 117 n.4. The more favorable discussion of actual nonreceipt by the person appears in separate opinions, not the majority holding. Id. at 123–25, 136–39.

Accordingly, the motion should not assume that service on counsel either defeats or establishes a current lack-of-notice claim. Current BIA and controlling-circuit law should be checked before relying on that theory. If supported by that law and the service record, counsel may consider pleading it as a separate statutory basis rather than treating it as interchangeable with ineffective assistance.

4. Submit supporting evidence with the motion

Submit available evidence with the motion rather than withholding it for a later appeal. In the former statutory setting, the Board stated that evidence supporting a rescission motion should be presented to the Immigration Judge with the motion. Matter of Grijalva, 21 I. & N. Dec. 27, 36–37 (BIA 1995).

Useful documents include:

  • The in absentia order, if one exists;
  • The hearing notice and proof of service;
  • Proof of counsel-of-record status;
  • Your sworn declaration;
  • The retainer agreement, receipts, and communications with counsel;
  • Phone, text, email, and messaging records;
  • Notice to former counsel and proof of delivery;
  • Any response from former counsel;
  • A disciplinary complaint or an explanation for not filing one; and
  • Evidence bearing on any defense to removal or eligibility for relief.

The 1995 Grijalva decision involved the former certified-mail regime and did not involve attorney noncommunication. It should not be relied on for current service standards or for the proposition that attorney error constitutes exceptional circumstances. Id. at 32–37.

Immediate next steps

  1. Get the court record immediately and determine whether an in absentia order was entered.
  2. Confirm the order date. Calculate 180 days from that date, not merely from the hearing date.
  3. Consult qualified immigration counsel immediately to prepare a possible motion before the 180-day period expires.
  4. Prepare a detailed declaration and preserve all communications with former counsel.
  5. Notify former counsel of the ineffective-assistance allegations and document delivery and any response, consistent with Lozada.
  6. Research current BIA and controlling-circuit authority on attorney noncommunication as exceptional circumstances, the current lack-of-notice rule when counsel was served, the applicable filing forum and regulation, and the degree of Lozada compliance required.
Every claim and the case behind it 7 claims
ClaimAuthorityVerdictWhy
was described in separate opinions in Matter of Lei as holding that ineffective assistance can constitute an exceptional circumstance supporting rescission of an in absentia orderMatter of Grijalva Not supportedThe provided Grijalva opinion does not address ineffective assistance of counsel at all; the respondent had no counsel of record at the time of the missed hearing, and the case instead concerns certified-mail service requirements under former section 242B. The excerpt explicitly notes the (A) prong of the rescission statute (which would cover 'exceptional circumstances') is not even quoted or discussed in the opinion. There is no basis in this text for the claim that Grijalva held IAC can be an exceptional circumstance, and the excerpt (which is of Grijalva itself, not Matter of Lei) cannot verify what a separate opinion in Lei said about Grijalva.
interpreted former INA § 242B as providing a 180-day period to rescind an in absentia order based on exceptional circumstances and an at-any-time route based on lack of noticeMatter of Lei GroundedThe opinion quotes the statutory text of § 242B(c)(3) distinguishing ground (A) (180-day exceptional circumstances motion) from ground (B) (motion filed 'at any time' for lack of notice), and the majority expressly relies on this framework in denying relief under (A).
requires an ineffective-assistance claim to include the respondent’s affidavit describing the agreement with former counsel and counsel’s acts or omissions, notice to former counsel with an opportunity to respond, and a statement regarding whether a disciplinary complaint was filed and why not if it was not filedMatter of Lozada GroundedThe headnote and body text set forth exactly these three requirements: an affidavit detailing the agreement with counsel and what counsel did/did not represent, notice to former counsel with opportunity to respond, and a statement on whether a disciplinary complaint was filed, and if not, why not.
explains that ineffective assistance requires counsel’s conduct to have made the proceeding fundamentally unfair by preventing the person from reasonably presenting the case, and requires prejudiceMatter of Lozada GroundedThe opinion states that ineffective assistance is a denial of due process only if the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case, and that one must also show prejudice, citing supporting case law.
noted that, under the former regulation, notice to counsel constituted notice to the noncitizenMatter of Lei GroundedThe majority cited 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(a) 'providing that notice to counsel constitutes notice to the alien' as a basis for its ruling, as reflected in both the Key Reasoning and Quotable Passages sections.
did not decide whether counsel’s receipt of notice coupled with counsel’s failure to communicate could support rescission under the separate lack-of-notice provisionMatter of Lei GroundedThe opinion explicitly states the majority 'did NOT decide the case on the lack of notice theory (§242B(c)(3)(B)...) because the respondent's motion was framed only as an exceptional circumstances motion,' and the dissents/concurrences argue for remand on precisely this unresolved question.
stated that evidence supporting a rescission motion should be presented to the Immigration Judge with the motionMatter of Grijalva GroundedThe opinion explicitly states: 'The evidence necessary to support the motion to reopen must be presented to the Immigration Judge with the motion to reopen,' directly supporting this claim.
Quality review 2 medium findings

QC FINDINGS

CRITICAL

None.

HIGH

None.

MEDIUM

  1. The description of the statutory rescission grounds is incomplete — The answer says INA § 240(b)(5)(C) provides “two materially different grounds” and lists exceptional circumstances and lack of notice. Section 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) also permits rescission at any time where the person was in federal or state custody and failed to appear through no fault of their own. That omission is unlikely to matter on the stated facts, but the statutory summary should not imply lack of notice is the only at-any-time ground.

  2. Inaccurate pinpoint citation to Matter of Lei — The answer cites “Lei, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 114, 117 n.4” for the proposition that the majority did not decide whether counsel’s receipt plus failure to communicate supported the lack-of-notice rescission route. The supplied text identifies footnote 4 at page 117 as stating only that the Board need not address Lozada compliance. The broader proposition is supported by Lei’s posture and discussion, but not by that footnote; the pinpoint should be corrected.

SUMMARY

The answer accurately identifies the principal in-absentia rescission routes, properly distinguishes obsolete authorities from current law, and appropriately avoids treating dissents as holdings. The main fixes are to provide a complete statutory summary and correct the Lei pinpoint citation.

VERDICT: CRITICAL=0 HIGH=0 MEDIUM=2

{
  "missing_authorities": []
}
Peer review by a second AI provider 2 issues raised

PEER REVIEW

# Issue Where Recommendation
1 Misattributed pin cite: the answer cites Lei, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 117 n.4 for the proposition that the majority "did not decide whether counsel's receipt coupled with a failure to communicate could support rescission under the separate lack-of-notice provision." Footnote 4 at page 117 actually states only: "Given our holding in this case, we need not address whether the respondent has satisfied the criteria set forth in Matter of Lozada... for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel." It says nothing about the lack-of-notice provision. The underlying substantive point (that the majority left the notice question undecided) is independently supported by the case summary's "Note," but the specific citation does not support it. § 3, second paragraph Cite the majority opinion's discussion of the notice-to-counsel regulation and its framing of the motion as an exceptional-circumstances motion only (see extraction "Note"), rather than footnote 4, or drop the pin cite to n.4.
2 Minor internal tension: Section 2 relies on the 1996 Grijalva holding (via Lei dissents) that IAC can be an "exceptional circumstance," while Section 1 relies on the Lei majority's holding that IAC does not excuse the 180-day filing deadline. The answer does distinguish these as separate questions (merits of exceptional circumstances vs. timeliness of the motion), but a reader could conflate them without a clearer explicit statement that the majority's rejection of IAC only concerned excusing the deadline, not the merits of what counts as exceptional circumstances. §§ 1–2 Add one sentence expressly stating that Lei's majority holding is limited to whether IAC excuses a late-filed motion, and does not resolve whether IAC otherwise qualifies as an "exceptional circumstance" on the merits.

ASSESSMENT

The answer is largely accurate: it correctly separates the Lei majority holding from the dissents/concurrences (never attributing dissenting views to the majority), correctly flags that Lei and the 1995 Grijalva decision interpret the superseded § 242B rather than current INA § 240(b)(5), and appropriately declines to state the holding of the 1996 Grijalva decision, which was not independently supplied. It also correctly narrows the 1995 Grijalva citation to the discrete point about submitting evidence with the motion, matching that case's actual (unrelated) holding. The one real grounding defect is a misattributed footnote citation in the discussion of the lack-of-notice theory, which does not change the substantive conclusion but is nonetheless inaccurate sourcing.

VERDICT: CRITICAL=0 HIGH=0 MEDIUM=2

{
    "missing_authorities": []
}

Not Shepardized. Existing in the record is not the same as still being good law — nothing here checks whether a later court overruled or abrogated these. Confirm before relying on them.